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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a story that is told more and more often across the nation in
newspaper headlines, classrooms and courtrooms. The place is
Brooklyn, New York. The year is 1993. A woman named "Molly" is
in labor and checks into a local hospital. Molly gives birth to a baby
boy hours later. So far, the story seems to be a happy one. However,
there is a sad twist. This innocent newborn baby has a positive
toxicology for cocaine and methadone.' Put more bluntly, this baby
is a drug addict by no choice of his own.
The Child Welfare Administration ("CWA") prevents both Molly
and the newborn baby from leaving the hospital on schedule. After
minimal counseling at the hospital, Molly is permitted to return home
with the baby on the condition that she attend weekly counseling at
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This paper was originally written for a Family Law II seminar taught by ProfessorJana Singer
at the Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Professor Singer for her
insightful suggestions at every stage of the creation of this paper and for challenging me
intellectually throughout the writing process. Also, I would like to thank Lisa Weinstein and
the Center for Addiction and Pregnancy at John Hopkins Bayview Medical Center for their
willingness to provide me with information regarding the vital work performed by the Center.
I am forever indebted to Elizabeth B. Rittenhouse not only for the case study that became the
heart of this paper, but also for sharing her thoughts on the topics discussed in the paper, and
most importantly, for her friendship. Finally, in writing a paper concerning the relationship
between mothers and their children, I was constantly aware of how fortunate I am to share such
a powerful relationship with my own mother. I only hope that I can give my own children the
same amount of love, energy and opportunity that my mother has given to me.
1. The facts of this narrative are true. They are provided by Elizabeth B. Rittenhouse. Ms.
Rittenhouse is a family counselor affiliated with Heart Share Human Services of New York, a
division of the Child Welfare Administration of New York City. She is the counselor who was
assigned to the case of the drug-addicted woman discussed in this opening narrative. While Ms.
Rittenhouse was able to fully share the facts of this client's case with me, confidentiality
requirements prevented her from divulging her client's name. Thus, the name "Molly" is not
the true name of this woman and is used for convenience purposes only.
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Heart Share Human Services of New York. During counseling, Molly
admits to the family counselor that she did indeed use drugs during
this pregnancy. In fact, Molly explains that her methadone use
during pregnancy was part of her normal routine. In contrast, Molly
says that she only used cocaine once during the pregnancy. Molly is
fairly disinterested in the counseling offered to her through Heart
Share. In fact, after only a few visits she stops attending the counsel-
ing sessions altogether. The family counselor assigned to the case
contacts CWA to determine what steps should be taken to ensure the
continuation of Molly's counseling. CWA advises the family counselor
to close the case, and the system forgets Molly, as well as, the newborn
baby. In the words of the family counselor, "they just fell through the
cracks of the system."
Unfortunately, Molly's story is not unique. Hundreds of thousands
of babies are born addicted to drugs each year. Molly's story reflects
a growing social problem which has led to charged and emotional
debates in state legislatures across the nation. Legislators are
struggling to fashion comprehensive solutions to the dilemma posed
by drug-addicted pregnant women. The goal of this paper is to
suggest a solution to this social problem which would decrease the
number of children born addicted to drugs in this country, while, at
the same time, furthering the interests of the women who mother
these children. The theory is that by serving the interests of
pregnant, drug-addicted women, society will also be serving the
interests of their fetuses. This is true because a healthy mother-child
relationship is the primary interest of both mother and fetus.
To comprehend the extent of the social problem presented by
substance abuse during pregnancy, Part II of this paper examines the
statistics reflecting the number of children born addicted to drugs in
this country each year, as well as, the effects which the addiction has
upon these innocent children. Part III draws upon the tenets of
cultural feminist theory to advocate solutions which not only
recognize that the interests of mother and fetus are compatible,
rather than conflicting, but also recognize a societal duty to aid
substance-addicted pregnant women. Part IV criticizes the post-birth
solutions of criminal prosecutions and the use of parental abuse and
neglect statutes because they do not adequately fulfill society's
affirmative obligation to provide rehabilitative aid to substance
addicted pregnant women. Part V examines involuntary civil
commitment of pregnant, drug-addicted women, in order to
determine if such commitment serves the interests of both mother
and fetus. This inquiry reveals that, while involuntary civil commit-
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ment may be benevolent in theory, its present day application is
subject to the same criticism levied upon the post-birth solutions.
That is, the present structure of commitment programs and the lack
of social funding currently available to needy pregnant women
combine to make the use of involuntary civil commitment undesir-
able, as it would ultimately create conflict between mothers and their
fetuses. Finally, Part VI examines more holistic approaches which
would give greater social support to drug-addicted pregnant women,
and argues that such approaches are the only mechanisms which will
enable mother and fetus to pursue their shared interest in a healthy
birth.
II. THE GRAVITY OF THE PROBLEM
The numbers are staggering. It is estimated that between 350,000
and 739,200 infants are born each year exposed to drugs in utero.2
Furthermore, approximately eleven percent of all pregnant women
have used illegal drugs while pregnant, and of those eleven percent,
seventy-five have used cocaine during a pregnancy. In urban areas,
the rate of newborn addiction has quadrupled since 1985.' Hospitals
in such areas estimate that more than twenty percent of the babies
born in their facilities are exposed to drugs in utero.5
To truly comprehend the tragedy that lies behind these statistics,
one must examine the detrimental effect which substance use during
pregnancy has on the developing fetus and, ultimately, the child. The
adverse effects of cocaine use on the health of the fetus are numer-
ous.6 Scientists have shown that pre-natal exposure to cocaine causes
2. Julia ElizabethJones, Comment, State Intervention in Pregnancy, 52 LA. L. REv. 1159,1160-
61 n.9 (1992); seelraj. Chasnoff, Dru~gs, Alcohol Pregnancy, and the Neonate; Pay Now or Pay Later,
266JAMA 1567 (1991) (discussing the discrepancy between the Institute of Medicine figures and
the Gamby and Shiono figures).
3. Jones, supra note 2, at 1160; see Board of Trustees, American Medical Association, Legal
Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially
HarmfulBehaviorby Pregnant Women, 264JAMA 2663,2666 (Helen M. Cole ed., 1990) (explaining
that infants who have been exposed to cocaine in utero have severe problems, such as rapid heart
rates, below average weight and decreased immune systems).
4. See generally James M. Wilton, Compelled Hospitalization and Treatment During Pregnancy:
Mental Health Statutes as Models for Legislation to Protect Children from Prenatal Drug and Alcohol
Exposure, 25 FAI. L.Q. 149, 149 (1991) (analyzing the decision of some states to allow forced
treatment for pregnant addicts, which may include incarceration for the period of pregnancy,
forced injections, and even forced caesarian sections); see also Dolores Kong, Massachusetts Reports
600 Infants Born Addicted Each Year, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 11, 1989, at 1, col. 2 (relating annual
figures on the number of addicted newborns in Boston over the past decade).
5. Jones, supra note 2, at 1160.
6. See Jones, supra note 2, at 1161 (examining the physical effects of addiction on
newborns, such as stunted growth in the limbs, underdeveloped organs, missing organs and
abnormal brain chemistry. These newborns often cost the hospital as much as twice the cost
of infants who are born prematurely for other reasons, because of extensive testing and
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an increased chance of fetal stroke and spontaneous abortions. Pre-
natal exposure to drugs is also linked to infant mortality.' Compared
to the average newborn, cocaine-addicted babies have shorter body
lengths and lower birth weights.8 In addition, these babies often have
smaller head circumferences, which are associated with lower IQ
scores.' Symptoms of drug withdrawal displayed by cocaine-addicted
babies are body tremors and irritability." Perhaps most significantly,
cocaine-exposed babies are often resistant to interaction with their
primary caretakers." As explained by a foster mother of a cocaine
addicted infant, "[t] he more you bounce them and coo at them, the
more they arch their backs to get away."12 Thus, cocaine use during
pregnancy is likely to impair the natural bond between mother and
child. 3 Many of the adverse effects on fetal development associated
with cocaine use during pregnancy also apply to use of heroin and
other narcotics by pregnant women. 4 In addition, narcotic-exposed
infants suffer very severe withdrawal symptoms which continue for
approximately four to six months after birth.15
While the primary focus of this paper is upon drug use during
pregnancy, excessive drinking of alcohol during pregnancy raises
many of the same concerns and, therefore, is also a problem
deserving of legislative attention. 6 Excessive drinking by pregnant
women has adverse effects upon the fetuses they carry. 7 Alcohol
related birth defects are referred to as Fetal Alcohol Syndrome
("FAS").18 Recent studies have shown that FAS is the leading known
monitoring procedures.).
7. SeeJones, supra note 2, at 1160.
8. Id
9. Jones, supra note 2, at 1161.
10. Wilton, supra note 4, at 153.
11. SeeAnastasia Toufexis, Innocent Vktims, TIME, May 13, 1991, at 56, 60 (describing how
addicted newborns tend to reject human contact, crying loudly and straining to get away).
12. Id.
13. See id. (stating that doctors at Harlem Hospital, in a study of seventy crack babies under
age two, found that almost half suffered from slow social and basic motor skill development, and
many had difficulty distinguishing between their mothers and strangers).
14. See generaly Board of Trustees, supra note 3, at 2666 (discussing the legal rights and
obligations of mothers and physicians).
15. See Wilton, supra note 4, at 153 (contending that effects of maternal drug abuse stay
with infants for life); see also Ira Chasnoff, Wlliam Bums, Sidney Schnell & Karen Bums, Cocaine
Use in Pregnaniy, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 666, 668 (1985) (detailing results of comparative
experiment between women who used cocaine while pregnant, women who had used narcotics
and were maintained on methadone throughout pregnancy and women who were drug-free).
16. See Wilton, supra note 4, at 149 (reporting statistics on Fetal Alcohol Syndrome).
17. Fetal Alcohol Syndrome occurs when an infant is born addicted to alcohol. This occurs
in approximately fifty percent of births to mothers who are themselves addicted to alcohol.
Infants with FetalAlcohol Syndrome are generally underweight and have underdeveloped brains.
Wilton, supra note 4, at 149.
18. Wilton, supra note 4, at 149.
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cause of mental retardation, having a worldwide incidence rate of 1.9
cases per 1,000 live births. 9 In fact, given the severity of FAS,
excessive drinking during pregnancy has the potential to cause even
greater and more permanent damage to fetuses than that caused by
cocaine or heroin use.2°
The social costs associated with the effects of substance abuse
during pregnancy are astounding. The national cost of medical care
for substance addicted infants in 1990 was estimated to be $504
million.2' On average, the neonatal cost of care and treatment of a
cocaine-exposed infant is $5,200 more than the cost of neonatal care
for an unexposed infant.22 Finally, children exposed to substance in
utero often require special education because of the learning
disabilities caused by the substance use during pregnancy.21 Special
education for one drug-exposed child in Boston, Massachusetts for
one year can cost $13,000, while the cost of one year of regular
schooling for a student not exposed to drugs is only $5,000.24 This
analysis of the detrimental effects of substance abuse during pregnan-
cy, as well as the social costs associated with those effects, demon-
strates that any excessive drug or alcohol use that is not monitored
during pregnancy is contrary to the societal and maternal goals of
promoting healthy babies.
III. RECOGNIZING SHARED INTERESTS
Most discussions on the issue of substance abuse during pregnancy
are flawed because they presume the mother and fetus are antagonis-
tic entities with conflicting interests.' This notion of matemal-fetal
19. Wilton, supra note 4, at 149; see also Warren & Bast, Alcohol Related Birth Defects: An
Update, 103 PuB. HEALTH REP. 638, 638 (1988) (discussing long-term effects of Fetal Alcohol
Syndrome, such as short attention spans, learning impediments like dyslexia and short term
memory loss).
20. Seegenerally Cynthia Gorney, WhoseBody Is ItAnyway? TheLegal Maelstrom ThatRages Wen
the Rights of Mother and Fetus Collide, WASH. POST (Inset Maternal-Fetal Conflict: Five Questions), Dec.
13, 1988 at D2 (questioning whether pregnant women who abuse alcohol, refuse to take diabetic
medication, or refuse medical treatment for religious reasons should undergo coerced cesarean
section operations).
21. SeeJones, supra note 2, at 1163 (comparing the treatment costs between infants born
addicted to cocaine and infants born drug-free); see also Ciaran S. Phibbs, David A. Bateman,
Rachel M. Schwartz, The Neonatal Costs of Maternal Cocaine Use, 266 JAMA 1521, 1525 (1991)
(examining the causes of increased neonatal costs due to fetal cocaine exposure, such as longer
periods in a respiratory unit or the need for expensive drugs to combat the cocaine addiction).
22. Jones, supra note 2, at 1162.
23. Jones, supra note 2, at 1162; seeToufexis, supra note 11, at 57 (discussing how cocaine-
addicted newborns have problems in school as a result of short attention spans, speech
impediments and poor hand and eye coordination).
24. See also Toufexis, supra note 11, at 59.
25. Board of Trustees, supra note 3, at 2666.
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conflict stems from the movement for greater recognition of fetal
interests warranting legal protection. 6 Advocates of fetal protection
have been successful in guaranteeing greater protection of the fetus
in many areas of the law. 7 Specifically, both criminal and tort law
have moved in the direction of recognizing fetal interests.28 In some
jurisdictions, criminal law has awarded the fetus protection through
statutes which punish fetal assault and feticide.29  For example, in
1970, California amended its homicide statute by defining murder as
"the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus," except in the case
of therapeutic abortions."0 As the California statute manifests, live
birth is not always a prerequisite to a conviction for fetal assault or
feticide."1
Tort law has recognized fetal interests through wrongful death
statutes which are designed to compensate survivors for the death of
a family member.3 2 Somejurisdictions have found a viable fetus to be
a "person" for the purposes of wrongful death statutes.3 In these
jurisdictions, parents can bring a wrongful death action against the
tortfeasor where his or her actions cause a spontaneous abortion or
a stillborn baby, as opposed to limiting wrongful death actions to
situations where there is a live birth, but the baby subsequently dies
due to the harm inflicted by the tortfeasor. Thus, as with criminal
law, many jurisdictions do not require live birth as a condition for
recovery in tort under wrongful death statutes.3 5
While concepts of criminal and tort law have explicitly recognized
fetal interests, these concepts do not place the mother and fetus in
26. Board of Trustees, supra note 3, at 2666.
27. Board of Trustees, supra note 3, at 2666.
28. See Kandel v. White, 1995 WL 500318, at 2 (Md., Aug. 24, 1995) (citing precedent for
allowing a tort cause of action for the death ofa fetus); but seeJohnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288,
1295 (Fla. 1992) (overturning an appellate decision to criminally prosecute a mother for
transferring drugs to her fetus through her umbilical cord after birth but before the cutting of
the cord).
29. See Cheryl E. Amana, Maternal-Fetal Conflict: A Call for Humanism and Consciousness in a
Time of Crisis, 3 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. 351, 357 (1992) (discussing fetal rights in the substantive
areas of probate, criminal and tort law).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988).
31. Id.
32. See generally Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 (Cal. 1977) (holding that the
distinction drawn between unborn and born children in a wrongful death statute is not arbitrary,
but is rationally related to legislative goals); W.E. Shipley. Annotation, Modern Status of Rule
Denying a Common Law Recovery for Wrongful Death, 61 A.L.1.3d 906, 914-15 (1975) (stating that,
with the exception of Hawaii, courts have consistently held that wrongful death is a statutory
creation which did not exist at common law).
33. SeeAmana, supra note 29, at 358; DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987);
see also W. PAGE KEETON Er AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 945-60
(5th ed. 1984).
34. Amana, supra note 29, at 358.
35. Amana, supra note 29, at 358.
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conflicting positions. Instead, these developments in criminal and
tort law recognize that the interests of parents and children in these
circumstances are shared.36 The parents and their unborn children
share the goal of having a healthy pregnancy free of any harmful
interference from third parties.3 By enabling the state, in the
criminal context, and the parents, in the civil context, to impose
liability on third parties who hinder the shared parental-fetal goal of
a healthy pregnancy, these doctrines of criminal and tort law
recognize the compatibility of interests between parents and their
unborn children."
The movement for greater protection of fetal interests is however,
problematic where the alleged "bad actor" is the mother.3 9 State
intervention during pregnancy is troubling because the cornerstone
of the American legal system is the promotion of individual rights.'
The law strongly recognizes that pregnant women have individual
rights deserving of constitutional protection. Such rights include the
right to reproductive and familial privacy,41 the right to bodily
integrity' and the right to equal protection under the law.43
It is true that the law has not recognized any constitutional right to
life or good health on the part of the fetus." In fact, the Supreme
36. See Amana, supra note 29, at 359 (citing Johnson v. Ruark Obstetric and Gynecology
Associates, 365 S.E.2d 909 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), afid, 395 S.E.2d 85 (N.C. 1990) (holding that
the parents' emotional distress was not too remote to prohibit recovery for physician's
negligence in causing a child to be stillborn).
37. Amana, supra note 29, at 359.
38. Amana, supra note 29, at 359.
39. See generally Amana, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
40. MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DiscouRsE, 40
(1991) (discussing the American tendency to define rights in absolute terms and how the right
of privacy model has steadily replaced the property rights model as the basis of law).
41. SeePlanned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(holding that the state may not "unduly burden" a woman's right to choose to abort a fetus
before viability); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking zoning ordinances that
impaired the ability of families to live together).
42. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2791 (holding that compelling a woman to carry a pregnancy to
term infringes upon her right to bodily integrity by imposing physical demands, invasions and
health risks); see, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (invalidating the surgical removal of
a bullet from a murder suspect under the theory of bodily integrity); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 565 (1969); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding mandatory stomach-
pumping unconstitutional).
43. See Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (striking down a state
statute that paid worker's compensation to widows of deceased workers but not widowers of
deceased workers).
44. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (denying fetal rights); see alsoJulie N. Qureshi,
Note, People v. Davis: California's Murder Statute and the Requirement of Viability for Fetal Murder 25
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 579, 588 (1995) (stating that the use of separate feticide statutes
instead of general murder statutes takes the explosive issue of viability out of the argument over
whether the state has a perpetual interest in the potential life because the fetus is being abused
by the mother's negligence. The state draws a distinction as to when they can intervene,
between harming a fetus a mother intends to birth and terminating a pregnancy as a legal,
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Court held in Roe v. Wade that the fetus is not a "person" under the
Fourteenth Amendment and is not entitled to the constitutional
protection of this Amendment.' However, Roe did recognize a state
interest in protecting potential life.46 Furthermore, since Roe, the
Supreme Court has magnified the state interest in protecting the fetus
and has given the state more authority to intervene during pregnan-
cy.47 State intervention during pregnancy is constitutional where the
state interest in protecting the fetus is deemed to outweigh the
constitutional rights of the pregnant woman.48 Even where the
constitutional balance favors state intervention during pregnancy,
such interference is problematic because it infringes upon the
individual rights of the pregnant woman. The constitutional analysis
which balances the rights of the pregnant woman against the state's
interest in protecting the fetus places the rights of the mother in
direct conflict with the interests of the fetus.
49
This balancing test has had an impact upon the unfolding debate
as to how the government should approach the problem of matemal
substance abuse. Because this issue has been framed in terms of
inherently conflicting constitutional rights, the most common
proposals addressing drug addiction during pregnancy vindicate
either the rights of the mother or the state interest in protecting the
fetus without attempting to fashion solutions which would meet the
needs and interests of both mother and fetus. This all-or-nothing
approach is typical where the problem presented is framed in terms
of rights.5" Rights analysis does not leave room for compromise.
conscious choice.).
45. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158; but see Christina L. Misner, Wat if Mary Sue Wanted an Abortion
Instead? The Effect of Davis v. Davis on Abortion Rights 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 265, 287 (1995)
(stressing that the fetus is in an unusual position because it is not given the rights of a living
human, but is more than a non-sentient grouping of cells).
46. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
47. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818-19 (holding that states may intervene "[e]ven in the earliest
stages of pregnancy" as long as such intervention does not impose an "undue burden" on a
woman's ability to decide whether to terminate the pregnancy); cf Bicka A. Barlow, Comment,
Severe Penaltiesfor theDestruction of "PotentialLife"- Cruel and Unusual Punishment ?29 U.S.F.L. REV.
463, 469 (1995) (arguing that if the privacy rights of the mother are not implicated, then the
state's interest in the well-being of the fetus can prevail. This has important implications for
maternal substance abusers, who are breaking the law and therefore may not be protected by
privacy arguments).
48. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64 (creating trimester system).
49. See Gorney, supra note 20, at D2 (criticizing the emphasis of fetal rights over maternal
rights in criminal law because it pits the mother against the fetus as adversaries, and fails to solve
the problems related to fetal cocaine exposure).
50. Cf GLENDON, supra note 40, at 40-46 (discussing the distinctly American belief in the
illusion of absolute rights. Glendon argues that the idea of rights without responsibilities brings
one individual, who may feel she has an inherent right to drive without wearing a seatbelt, into
direct conflict with another, who bears the burden of the inevitable loss of a loved one and
financial responsibility of paying the medical bills or funeral expenses.).
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Where the rights of two individuals or groups of individuals are
slightly in tension with one another, the law solves the conflict by
vindicating the rights of one or the other, but never both.51 Because
rights, by definition, are all-or-nothing, solving social problems
through rights analysis requires that one individual or group win and
the other lose.
5 2
Feminist legal theory has widely criticized rights analysis. 3
Specifically, cultural feminist theory argues that the law is a reflection
of the masculine voice and therefore reflects only the value of
autonomy." The focus of the American legal system on rights
analysis is an example of the lack of a female voice in the law. 5
Cultural feminism defines women as typically more oriented toward
relationships and therefore, more caring than men.56 Cultural
feminists assert that men usually view problems in terms of "abstract
rights," while women approach dilemmas in terms of "real and
complex relationships between people." Women attempt to resolve
conflicts through "strategies that maintain connection and relation-
ship."58 Thus, the theory underlying cultural feminism is that by
embracing the female voice, the law would come to recognize and
respect the specifically feminine values of connection and caring over
the male value of autonomy. 9 More importantly, the recognition of
the female voice in the law would lead to solutions of social problems
which vindicate the interests of all parties involved rather than merely
vindicating the rights of one party over another.60
51. GLENDON, supra note 40, at 46.
52. GLENDON, supra note 40, at 40-46.
53. See Patricia A. Cain, FeministJurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
LJ. 191, 200 (1990) (arguing that one must first understand the different levels on which
feminism is viewed in society to conduct a discourse on rights analysis).
54. Id,
55. Id.
56. See Naomi R. Cahn & Marie Ashe, Child Abuse: A Problefa for Feminist Theory, 2 TEX.J.
WOMEN & LAw 75 (1993) (hereinafter Child Abuse] (contending that the ideology of modem
femininity is centered around self-sacrifice and domesticity); see also CAROL GILIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE 100 (1982) (arguing thatwomen are more self-critical than men, and therefore
have a harder time achieving success than men).
57. See Child Abuse, supra note 56, at 95 (observing that the moral structures of women make
their approaches to obstacles in life different from the approach of men); see geerally RANDJACK
& DANA C.JAcK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN
AND MEN LAWYERS 188 (1989) (showing through statistics the difference between the way male
and female attorneys approach problems).
58. See Child Abuse, supra note 56 (citing NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO
ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION 51-58 (1984)) (offering a definition of liberal feminism, cultural
feminism, radical feminism and postmodern feminism).
59. Cain, supra note 53, at 200.
60. Cf GLENDON, supra note 40, at 40-46 (advocating a more feminine approach to maternal
substance abuse regulations).
113
114 JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW [Vol. 4:105
Because of cultural feminism's emphasis on maintaining relation-
ship and connection, it is a very useful perspective from which to
analyze the social problem of substance-abusing pregnant women.61
Cultural feminist theory, as applied to this problem, has two implica-
tions. First, cultural feminism stands for the proposition that society
has an affirmative obligation to act in order to aid pregnant women
addicted to controlled substances. 2 Second, in fulfilling this
obligation, society should act in a facilitative, rather than in an
adversarial manner."
The first assertion that society has a duty to aid pregnant women
stems from the fact that the experience of "mothering" is central to
cultural feminist theory.' Cultural feminists assert that women are
more connected to others because their mothering experiences make
them more cognizant and appreciative of their own interdependence
with their children.' This celebration of the female role as mother
serves as the basis for the cultural feminist assertion that society must
guarantee special protection for women in order to accommodate
their particularized role as nurturers. 6 Thus, cultural feminist theory
supports the notion that society has a duty to recognize and accom-
modate the special needs of pregnant women. This societal duty
61. See GILuGAN, supra note 56, at 100 (introducing the concept that feminism should be
discussed with the current cultural limitations of women in mind).
62. See Cain, supra note 53, at 200 (developing the concept of cultural feminism as a
facilitative approach to solving the problem of fetal cocaine addiction).
63. Cain, supra note 53, at 200.
64. See Child Abuse, supra note 56, at 95 (taking a Freudian approach to the role and history
of motherhood); see also Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6 FEMINIST STUD. 342, 343 (1980)
(describing the experience of mothering in conjunction with concepts of power and
powerlessness); Robin West, Juisprudence and Gender 55 U. CHt. L. REv. 1, 27-29 (1988) (stating
that "women have a 'sense' of an existential 'connection' to other human life which men do
not."); see generally NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUGrION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND
THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978).
65. Child Abus4 supra note 56, at 95; see West, supra note 64, at 27-29 (asserting that cultural
feminism views women as feeling a natural sense of hierarchy because the most important
"other" in her life is the infant who depends upon her).
66. See Child Abuse, supra note 56, at 95 (explaining the pitfalls of not addressing women's
particular experiences in sexual equality cases, such as economic conditions, physical needs and
social obstacles based on gender); see also Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk
About Women, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 15, 19 (1991) (alleging that the inclusion of men in the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1990 resulted in the ultimate defeat of the Act); Christine A.
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987) (proposing a theory of
sexual equality called "equality as acceptance" and arguing that"women's biological and cultural
differences from men ... are real and significant [and] [wiomen's inequality results when
society devalues women because they differ from the male norm.").
67. See Child Abuse; supra note 56, at 96 (supporting cultural feminism's unique approach
to maternal substance abuse which advocates cooperation with the mother instead of placing
antagonistic restrictions on her); see also Littleton, supra note 66, at 26-27 (discussing dangers
of using pregnancy leave as a"special" need which dilutes feminist claims of equality with men);
cf. LindaJ. Krieger & Patricia M. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive
Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 513, 560 (1983)
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includes the obligation to address the very particularized needs of
pregnant substance-addicted women.' The second assertion of
cultural feminism is that society must not adopt adversarial approach-
es which view the mother and fetus as distinct legal entities with
adverse interests and assume that the state must protect the fetus
from the mother.69 Adversarial approaches create maternal-fetal
conflicts which ultimately inhibit the governmental objective of
promoting healthy births. ° Cultural feminism embraces facilitative
approaches which realize that pregnant women share the state's
interest in protecting their fetuses and promoting healthy babies.7
1
Facilitative approaches recognize that obstacles which exist in the
lives of many pregnant women, not bad intentions, hinder the
achievement of this common goal.72 Such obstacles include addiction,
poor information and poverty.73 Facilitative approaches attempt to
remove these obstacles. Such approaches consist of positive, effective
and cost efficient governmental policies which expand the choices of
pregnant women by providing them with greater financial, physical
and emotional support.74
In order to accept the need for positive governmental policies in
addressing this social problem, it is necessary to understand the plight
of women who abuse their fetuses by using substances during
pregnancy. In other words, it is necessary to fully examine the
everyday circumstances under which these women live.75 Greater
awareness of the impediments that exist in the lives of women who
use controlled substances during pregnancy will make society less apt
to condemn, and more willing to aid, these women.76
(presenting view that women are subjected to a disability that men do not confront when
companies impose a no-sick-leave policy disallowing them to take off work during their
pregnancy); But see Lucinda Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1181-82 (1986) (concluding that maternity leave
benefits both men and women).
68. Child Abus supra note 56, at 96.
69. See Dawn Johnson, Shared Interests: Pronoting Healthy Births Without Sacrifiing Women's
Liberty, 43 HASTING'S LJ. 569, 570 (1992) (reciting restrictive measures that the government has
already imposed on pregnant women who are substance abusers, such as incarceration for the
period of the pregnancy).
70. Id. at 572.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 571.
73. I&t at 574.
74. SeeJohnson, supra note 69, at 571 (asserting that the government should help mothers,
but not control their life-decisions, such as having children).
75. See CHODORONV, supra note 64 (discussing society's pressing need to condemn maternal
substance abusers).
76. But see Child Abuse supra note 56, at 76 (describing the stereotypical image of the "bad
mother," as being a mother who abandons her children, either by leaving them at home while
she works, or abusing them in some way, including substance addiction. This concept puts the
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Even cultural feminist theory, however, has not attempted to tell
the story of abusive mothers, and has not included these mothers
within its definition of motherhood." This is surprising given cultural
feminism's focus on the importance of "understand[ing] the pain in
women's lives as different from that in men's lives.""8  Feminist
scholars have a duty to give a voice to these women by telling their
narratives and applying feminist theory to their circumstances. 79
Thus, before accepting or rejecting a solution to the problem of drug
use during pregnancy, society must be willing to open its eyes to the
complete narratives of women who abuse drugs while pregnant. °
Only part of Molly's narrative is revealed in the opening paragraphs
of this paper. It is important to note, that given the lack of female
voice in law and in society in general, the facts included in the
opening paragraphs are all that would be recited if Molly's story were
recounted in the headlines, or even in the courtroom. More
importantly, these facts alone make Molly seem extremely culpable
and deserving of punishment. After all, she did use drugs during
pregnancy and, as a result, her child was born an addict. On these
facts alone, society would undoubtedly be willing to condemn her.
However, by taking the time and effort to uncover and listen to the
complete narrative of Molly, one comes to realize that she is not as
culpable as she first appears."
blame for fetal cocaine addiction solely on the mother, and not on the other individuals
involved or the society in which she lives).
77. Child Abuse, supra note 56, at 95 (claiming that cultural feminists do not have the
concept of a "bad mother" in their ideology).
78. Child Abuse, supra note 56, at 95; see also Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic
Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S LJ. 81 (1987) (arguing
that the joy and pain men and women experience is different and that women's pain is often
ignored by the law and provided no remedy).
79. See Child Abuse; supra note 56, at 95 (averring the need for cultural feminists to widen
their outlook with regard to the needs of maternal substance abusers and the infants who suffer
most).
80. Child Abuse supra note 56, at 95.
81. Child Abuse, supra note 56, at 95; see also IraJ. Chasnoff, Drug Use in Pregnancy: Parameters
of Risk, 35 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 1403, 1406 (1988) (discussing the pros and cons of the
"Methadone Maintenance Program," a program which takes a limited number of substance
addicted candidates and breaks their addiction by giving them regular injections of methadone.
The individuals must come to the clinic to get their injections and participate in seminars
designed to help them get a job and make them better equipped to deal with finances and
raising a family. Participants become addicted to the methadone, but it is much easier to break
the addiction to methadone than to break an addiction to cocaine or heroin. Although most
clinics will not take pregnant substance abusers, a few will, on an in-patient basis. The pregnant
women complain that these programs restrict their freedom and sometimes force them to
undergo medical procedures that they do not want, such as caesarian sections. Women also fear
prosecution for their drug use, which could cause them to lose custody of their child. As a
result, the methadone maintenance program has not had a high success rate for maternal
substance abusers.).
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Molly is an unemployed, single Hispanic woman who lives in public
housing and survives from day to day on public assistance. 2 Molly is
the mother of five children. Molly's explanation for her fifth baby's
positive toxicology for methadone is quite revealing. She is a
recovering heroin addict and has been for years. As part of her
recovery she participates in the "Methadone Maintenance Pro-
gram.""3 This is a government funded program which was instituted
as a solution to the growing problem of heroin use. Individuals
addicted to heroin are advised to come to the clinic on a regular basis
to receive a dosage of methadone. Methadone acts as a substitute for
heroin and is equally addictive. The initial philosophy of the program
was to slowly decrease the dosage individuals received at the clinic in
order to wean people off the substances altogether. However, the
program has been true to its name and individuals are maintained on
methadone indefinitely. Thus, during her pregnancy, Molly contin-
ued participating in the methadone maintenance program because
she was never advised to discontinue her use. 4 As a result, her baby
was born addicted to methadone.
Molly describes the baby's positive toxicology for cocaine as a
"cultural thing."85 She says that she only used cocaine once during
the pregnancy at the very end.8" She explains that when she went
into labor, she was told by some of her female neighbors that by
taking a "hit" of cocaine she would be able to deliver the baby faster
and more easily. Since cocaine speeds up the body's processes,
Molly's neighbors were correct. What neither Molly nor her neigh-
bors knew was that this single "hit" of cocaine would negatively effect
Molly's newborn.8 7
Molly's full narrative demonstrates that she did not have a malicious
desire to harm her fetus. Rather, obstacles, such as poverty, addiction
and lack of information, prevented her from delivering a healthy
baby. Thus, before condemning Molly, society must be willing to take
responsibility for failing to fulfill its duty to support her in her
mothering role through financial, physical and emotional support.
82. These additional facts of the "Molly" narrative were also provided by Ms. Rittenhouse,
supra note 1.
83. Chasnoff, supra note 81, at 1406.
84. Interview with Elizabeth B. Rittenhouse, supra note 1.
85. Interview with Elizabeth B. Rittenhouse, supra note 1.
86. Cf.Jones, supra note 2, at 1161 (stating that cocaine is not physically addictive, but habit
forming. This means that a single hit of cocaine for a pregnant woman is not likely to cause the
fetus to be born addicted to cocaine. It is, however, likely to cause severe birth defects.).
87. Interview with Elizabeth B. Rittenhouse, supra note 1.
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IV. A CRITIQUE OF SOLUTIONS WHICH FAIL TO REHABILITATE
In an attempt to address the dilemma posed by substance-addicted
pregnant women, state policy makers have invoked both criminal
statutes and abuse and neglect laws.' When viewed from the
perspective of cultural feminism, both these forms of state interven-
tion are faulty because they do not adequately fulfill society's
affirmative obligation to render rehabilitative aid to substance abusing
women.
In 1977, prosecutors in California sought to convict a woman under
its felony child endangerment statute for using heroin during
pregnancy.8 9 The prosecution was unsuccessful, as the California
Appellate Court held that pregnant women could not be prosecuted
under the felony endangerment statute because a fetus is not a
"child" within the meaning of the statute.9" To overcome the
problem that a fetus is not considered a child under criminal abuse
or endangerment statutes, prosecutors in Michigan, Florida, Georgia,
South Carolina and Massachusetts have attempted to convict
substance-abusing pregnant women under statutes prohibiting
delivering drugs to minors.91
The argument follows that in the one-to-two minute time period
after birth, but before cutting the umbilical cord, drugs are delivered
by the mother to the newborn baby.92 The intent of these statutes,
however, was obviously not to punish pregnant women who use drugs,
but rather to convict drug dealers.93 Recognizing this, appellate
88. See Board of Trustees, supra note 3, at 2666 (listing the various regulations in force
regarding maternal substance abuse, such as criminal penalties, wrongful death actions and
forced incarcerations for pregnant substance abusers).
89. Marcy Tench Stovall, Note, Looking for a Solution: In re Valerie D. and State Intervention
in Prenatal DrugAbuse, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 1265, 1267 (1993); see alsoTamar Lewin, Court inFloida
Upholds Conviction for Drug Deliveiy by Umbilical Cord, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1991, at 6 (upholding
the first conviction of a woman charged with delivering cocaine to her infant through umbilical
cord); but see Reyes v. Superior Court of San Bernadino, 141 CAL. REvr. 912, 912-13 (1977)
(holding that the penal statute prohibiting the sale or delivery of drugs to a child does not
include a fetus or unborn child).
90. Stovall, supra note 89, at 1267.
91. Stovall, supra note 89, at 1269; see alsoJan Hoffman, Pregnant, Addicted-and Guilty?, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 19, 1990 (Magazine), at 32, 34 (detailing current legislation on pregnant women
who deliver drugs to an infant in utero. The article criticizes forced incarceration and forced
medical treatment for pregnant substance abusers who seek help because they are concerned
for the health of their fetus.); cf. People v. Marabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843, 844-45 (Geneva City Ct.
1992) (holding that giving rights to the fetus would deny the mother due process).
92. Stovall, supra note 89, at 1269.
93. See Stovall, supra note 89, at 1280 (suggesting that cooperative treatment between the
mother and health care officials should be favored by courts over statutes which punish mothers
for their behavior); see alsoJohnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1295 (Fla. 1992) (stating that the
legislature expressly chose to treat drug-dependent mothers and newborns as a health problem
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courts, relying purely on statutory interpretation, have overturned
convictions of mothers under drug delivery statutes. 4 In fact, no
appellate court has upheld a criminal conviction for transmission of
a controlled substance in utero or for transmission during birth."
Courts, however, have not foreclosed the possibility that legislatures
may amend their criminal statutes to prohibit drug use during
pregnancy. 6
State child protective agencies have instituted abuse and neglect
proceedings in cases where women gave birth to drug-addicted
babies.97 In particular, Connecticut recently attempted to use child-
protection laws to terminate the parental rights of a woman who gave
birth to a cocaine-addicted baby named Valerie D.11 In August of
1991, the appellate court upheld the termination of parental rights in
the case of Valerie D., finding that "a petition for termination of
parental rights can be supported solely by evidence of a mother's
prenatal conduct." 9 The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the
termination of parental rights, reasoning that the legislature did not
intend for the termination statute to apply to prenatal parental
conduct that harmed a child.1°°
As an alternative to termination of parental rights, child protective
agencies have attempted to petition for custody of babies born
addicted to drugs, arguing that they are neglected, uncared for and
abused.' Courts have defeated such civil prosecutions on statutory
grounds, finding that legislatures did not intend to protect fetuses
under these laws.' 2 As with criminal statutes, courts have left state
rather than impose criminal penalties on women who were addicted while pregnant).
94. Stovall, supra note 89, at 1269; seeJohnson, 602 So. 2d at 1288 (holding that the transfer
of drugs through the umbilical cord did not constitute delivery of drugs to a minor according
to the criminal statute).
95. SeeJanna C. Merrick, Maternal Substane Abuse Duing Pregnancy: Policy Implications in the
United States, 14J. LEGAL MED. 57,62 (1993) (theorizing on the effects ofcriminalizing maternal
substance abuse).
96. But see In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748, 755 (Conn. 1992) (refusing to terminate the
parent-child relationship on the theory of prenatal delivery of drugs to an unborn minor when
the mother's drug use transferred cocaine to the fetus via the umbilical cord).
97. Id. at 755.
98. See id. at 755 (alleging that the act of commission or omission of proper and necessary
care authorized the termination of the mother's parental rights).
99. See In re Valerie D. 595 A.2d 922, 925 (Conn. App. CL 1991), reu'd 613 A.2d 748 (Conn.
1992) (deciding that the use of drugs during pregnancy could be used as evidence of neglect
on the part of the mother).
100. Stovall supra note 89, at 1266; see In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d at 758-62 (requiring more
than substance abuse to terminate parental rights for neglect).
101. See Stovall, supra note 89, at 1266; see also In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d at 755 (proclaiming
that maternal substance abuse constitutes "intentional and severe parental neglect").
102. SeeRobert Horowitz, PrenatalSubstanceAbuse: A Coordinated Public Health and Child Welfare
Response CHILDREN TODAYJuly-Aug. 1990, at 8 (outlining the constitutional issue of a woman's
right to privacy).
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legislatures free to amend their child protection laws to include
protection of fetuses. 10 3
State legislatures should not adopt statutes sanctioning intervention
during pregnancy through criminal or civil prosecutions. Neither
making drug use during pregnancy criminal, nor the use of child
protection statutes satisfies the dual cultural feminist goal of promot-
ing healthy births while maintaining the mother-child relationship.
Criminal prosecution in this context is faulty for two reasons. First,
it constitutes an adversarial rather than facilitative approach and does
not focus on maintaining the mother-child relationship. °4 Second,
criminal prosecution for drug use during pregnancy typically occurs
only after pregnancy and, consequently, does not further the goal of
promoting healthy births. 5
In theory, the use of abuse and neglect statutes does further the
goal of maintaining the mother-child relationship with the primary
goal of state intervention under these statutes being reunification of
the family. 6 However, the use of child protection laws in this context
is similar to that of criminal statutes because state involvement
typically occurs only after birth. Post-birth legal responses do not
prevent harm to the child caused by prenatal substance abuse. 107
By bringing a criminal prosecution against the mother the state
adopts an adversarial rather than facilitative approach. Such
prosecutions place the mother and the newborn in conflicting
positions and ignore their interdependence and shared interest in a
healthy mother-child relationship.08 If the state is successful, the
mother will be incarcerated and thus separated from her child. 9 By
invoking criminal sanctions in this context, society directly punishes
these women for their behavior during pregnancy. The threat of
punishment posed by criminal prosection is likely to discourage
pregnant women from seeking prenatal care for fear of being
incarcerated."' Failure to receive prenatal care is extremoely harmful
to both mother and fetus."' The underlying assumption of criminal
103. In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d at 757.
104. See Horowitz, supra note 102, at 8 (rejecting a strictly criminal approach to maternal
substance abuse and favoring a more cooperative approach instead).
105. Horowitz, supra note 102, at 8.
106. Horowitz, supra note 102, at 8.
107. Horowitz, supra note 102, at 8.
108. Amana, supra note 29, at 359-61.
109. Amana, supra note 29, at 359-61.
110. See Stovall, supra note 89, at 1266 (inferring a connection between maternal substance
abuse statutes and most maternal substance abusers' refusal to get prenatal care).
111. SeeStovall, supra note 89, at 1267 (proposing that a facilitative approach will bring more
maternal substance abusers in for treatment without fear of prosecution).
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prosecution in this context must be that it is beneficial for society to
protect these children from their abusive mothers.112 This assump-
tion, however, is faulty.1 3 As the perspective of cultural feminism
makes clear, the most socially beneficial solution to drug abuse during
pregnancy is a solution which rehabilitates the mother and, in doing
so, promotes the relationship between mother and child."4 There-
fore, any form of state intervention, such as criminal prosecution,
which obstructs or severs the mother-child relationship, serves only to
punish, and thereby defeats the socially beneficial goal of maintaining
any relationship.
Perhaps more importantly, both criminal prosecution and the use
of child protection laws are deficient because state involvement occurs
only after birth and cannot achieve the goal of ensuring healthy
babies.' Rehabilitation must come during or prior to pregnancy in
order to benefit the children of drug-addicted women." 6  Society
must attempt to rehabilitate women addicted to substances through
financial, physical and emotional support."' Thus, the state has an
obligation to become involved prior to birth in order that the shared
maternal-fetal interest in a healthy newborn as well as a healthy
mother-child relationship may be achieved.
V. INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT: A BAND-AID SOLUTION
Involuntary civil commitment is a mechanism used by the state to
force individuals to receive treatment or care when he or she poses
a threat of "harm to self or others" due to a mental or physical
impairment or disability."' Involuntary hospitalization has been a
part of mental health law in this country for a century and a half."9
Involuntary civil commitment serves the dual function of safeguarding
society from the mentally ill and affording treatment and rehabilita-
tion for the individual patient.' 0 Commitment laws, in general, are
justified by both the police power of the state, which permits state
112. Stovall, supra note 89, at 1277.
113. Stovall, supra note 89, at 1277.
114. See Child Abuse supra note 56.
115. Stovall, supra note 89, at 1298-99.
116. Stovall, supra note 89, at 1266.
117. See Stovall, supra note 89, at 1266.
118. SeeSandraAnderson Garcia & Ingo Keilitz, Involuntary Civil Commitment ofDrug-Dependent
Persons Wirth Special Reference to Pregnant Women, 15 MENTAL & PHYS. DISAB. L. REP. 418, 418
(1991) [hereinafter Involuntary Civil Commitment] (describing the process whereby legal and
social service systems work together to forcibly impose treatment on mentally or physically
impaired people).
119. See Wilton, supra note 4, at 163 (citing BRAKEL, PARRY & WEINER, THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAw 22 (3d ed. (1985)).
120. Wilton, supra note 4, at 163.
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action to protect society from dangerous individuals,1 2' and the parens
patriae power, which permits state action to protect individuals who
are unable to protect or care for themselves.122  Some states have
considered alcoholism and drug dependence to be impairments
subject to commitment laws.12 Thus, while treatment programs for
drug-dependent persons are mostly voluntary in this country, civil
commitment laws have been used to forcibly admit and treat
alcoholics and drug addicts.1
2 1
The Supreme Court, in dicta, affirmed the constitutionality of the
practice of involuntarily committing substance-dependent individuals
for alcohol or drug treatment in Robinson v. California." The
Robinson Court invalidated a criminal statute, which made the "status"
of narcotic addiction a criminal offense on the grounds that the
statute inflicted "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 6 The Court opined that states
could constitutionally address the social problem presented by drug-
dependent individuals through "compulsory treatment, involving...
confinement" of individuals addicted to narcotics. 27
Currently, twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have
specific provisions providing for the forced civil commitment of drug-
dependent persons, while eleven states have limited provisions
sanctioning such commitment.1 2' An additional eleven states permit
the involuntary commitment of drug-dependent persons under the
121. Wilton, supra note 4, at 163.
122. Wilton, supra note 4, at 163-64.
123. Wilton, supra note 4, at 165 (discussing the traditional practice of some states to broadly
interpret general statutory language as allowing civil commitment of drug and alcohol addicts).
124. See Involuntary Civil Gommitmen supra note 118, at 418 (noting that the District of
Columbia, alongwith 75% of the states, have involuntary commitment laws which deal with drug
dependent persons).
125. SeeDavid F. Chavkin, "For Their Own Good": Civil Commitment ofAlcohol andDrug-Dependent
Pregnant Women, 37 S.D. L. REV. 224, 246 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665 n.7
(1962) (holding the criminalization of alcohol or drug dependency unconstitutional, yet noting
that civil commitment and mandatory treatmept for alcohol and drug dependency is a
constitutional alternative).
126. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666 (explaining that laws that make it a crime to be mentally
or physically ill would be considered cruel and unusual punishment by most of society even
though society often deals with the mentally and physically ill in the same manner, through
compulsory treatment).
127. Id.
128. See Involuntary Civil Commitment supra note 118, at 418 (noting that a state may provide
for the commitment of drug addicts by adopting an involuntary commitment statute. In
addition, states without involuntary commitment provisions for drug dependency may classify
drug dependency as a mental illness and apply the provisions for the involuntary commitment
of the mentally ill). The states with detailed provisions specifically authorizing civil commitment
are: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
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traditional "mentally ill commitment laws."1 29  However, four states
expressly exclude substance dependence or addiction from the
coverage of their commitment laws."3
The statutes having specific provisions authorizing forced civil
commitment of drug-dependent persons share some common
features. First, because these commitment laws are modeled after
mental health commitment laws, they limit involuntary civil commit-
ment to "drug-dependent persons who are in need of treatment and
care, are likely to be dangerous to themselves or others, or who are
unable to meet their basic needs for sustenance, shelter or self-
protection."131 Second, under most drug-dependency commitment
laws, commitment proceedings may be initiated by any adult, as well
as by law enforcement officers and authorized care and treatment
providers. 3 2 Third, in order to meet the constitutional requirements
of procedural due process, all involuntary civil commitment laws
require procedural protections including notice, a commitment
hearing, the right to counsel at this hearing, judicial review of the
commitment order, and a definite initial commitment period. 3 The
commitment statutes however, typically allow detention of individuals
for evaluation or emergency care and treatment pending a formal
judicial hearing."
States having civil commitment laws expressly covering drug-
dependent persons have generally articulated the legislative intent
behind their statutes. 5 Some of these states explain the public policy
behind the commitment of substance addicts as necessary to afford
such persons treatment and rehabilitation opportunities in the least
restrictive environment possible.136 State legislatures have also viewed
129. See Involuntary Civil Commitment, supra note 118, at 418. Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont and Virginia have limited
statutory provisions relating to involuntary civil commitment, but allow civil commitment
through their mental illness commitment laws.
130. See Involuntary Civil Commitment, supra note 118, at 418 (citing ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.30.915(12) (1984); Am. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-501(22) (a) (1986 & Supp. 1990); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 135-C:2(X) (1977 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.03 (20) (McKinney
1988)).
131. Involuntary Civil Commitment, supra note 118, at 419.
132. Involuntary Civil Commitment, supra note 118, at 419.
133. See Involuntary Civil Commitment, supra note 118, at 422 (discussing state statutory
provisions intended to preserve due process protections in civil commitment matters because
of the deprivation of liberty involved).
134. See Involuntary Civil Commitment, supra note 118, at 421 (allowing periods of detention
ranging from 72 hours to two weeks for the states with specific civil commitment laws. Generally
to be committed on an emergency basis a person must be dangerous to herself or others.).
135. Involuntary Civil Commitment, supra note 118, at 420.
136. See Involuntary Civil Commitment, supra note 118, at 420 (noting that Hawaii, Louisiana,
North Carolina, Oklahoma and Wisconsin have articulated a desire to provide treatment in an
environment that is minimally restrictive).
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these commitment laws as a way to return drug addicts to society."i 7
In addition, some states assert that their commitment laws serve to
protect the rights and personal liberties of individuals addicted to
drugs, because forced civil commitment is viewed as an alternative to
criminal punishment." Finally, the legislative intent behind some of
these commitment laws is the more conservative desire to protect the
health and safety of the general public and to prevent or reduce
substance abuse.1
39
Minnesota is one of the twenty-four states having specific provisions
providing for involuntary civil commitment of drug-dependent
persons. 4° Minnesota, however, goes further than the other twenty-
three states in that only Minnesota has explicitly provided for the
involuntary civil commitment of pregnant drug-dependent wom-
en.' 4 1 In addition, Minnesota is one of the few states which requires a
physician to test a pregnant woman for drug use where the physician
has reason to suspect drug abuse by the pregnant woman."'
Furthermore, Minnesota law imposes a duty on physicians to report
a positive toxicology test of a pregnant woman to the local welfare
agency4
These mandatory testing and reporting laws, which apply only to
pregnant women, reinforce the Minnesota involuntary civil commit-
ment provision. When a welfare agency receives a report of drug use
by a pregnant woman, the agency must offer services, such as referrals
for chemical dependency assessment, treatment and prenatal care.
144
137. See Involuntary Civil Commitment, supra note 118, at 420 (citing the statutes from Florida,
Louisiana and North Dakota as examples of states that seek to use commitment as a means of
returning drug addicts to the community).
138. See Involuntaqy Civil Commitment, supra note 118, at 420 (observing that Louisiana, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Wisconsin denote civil commitment as an alternative
to criminal punishment).
139. See Involuntay Civil Commitment, supra note 118, at 420 (reporting that only California,
the District of Columbia and Oklahoma specifically express an interest in protecting individuals
from drug addiction, referring to the problem as a social "menace").
140. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 subd. 2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (providing that pregnant
women who partake in "habitual and excessive use" of cocaine, heroin, phencyclidine,
methamphetamine or amphetamines may be committed for up to six months, after which
another petition for commitment may be filed).
141. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 subd. 2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (defining a "chemically
dependent person" to include "a pregnant woman who has engaged during the pregnancy in
habitual or excessive use, for a nonmedical purpose, of any of the following controlled
substances or their derivatives: cocaine, heroin, phencyclidine, methamphetamine, or
amphetamine").
142. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5562 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
143. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561-5562 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); See also Horowitz, supra
note 102, at 8.
144. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
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The agency is authorized to commence civil commitment proceedings
if the pregnant woman refuses to cooperate in treatment1
45
State legislatures view involuntary civil commitment of pregnant
drug users as a mechanism to address the social problem of substance
addiction during pregnancy." Civil commitment is distinguishable
from criminal and civil prosecutions, in that it is a form of pre-birth
intervention, which has the potential both to protect the developing
fetus and to rehabilitate, rather than punish, the expecting mother.
Arguably, this form of state intervention is a paternalistic approach,
which would force a pregnant woman to act against her will in the
short term in order to help herself and her baby, so that she can
achieve her long term goal of a healthy baby and the potential for a
healthy mother-child relationship.
The Minnesota scheme, which expressly provides for civil commit-
ment of pregnant drug-dependent women, as well as the civil
commitment statutes of other states, which permit forced commit-
ment of pregnant substance abusing women, have been greatly
criticized and challenged on constitutional grounds.1 47 A common
constitutional attack on this form of state intervention is based upon
the privacy rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Opponents argue that forced civil commitment of drug-dependent
pregnant women infringes upon reproductive and familial privacy
rights, the right to bodily integrity and the right to equal protec-
tion.1
4 9
The right to reproductive and familial privacy has been established
through Supreme Court precedent, which affirms privacy rights in
activities related to marriage,'150 contraception,1 51 abortion,152 family
145. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
146. See Involuntary Civil Commitment, supra note 118, at 420 (explaining that as commitment
was used to solve the "social problem" of the mentally ill, so too has it been used for the
problems of drug dependency. However, in applying commitment statutes meant for the
mentally ill to the pregnant, drug-dependant, there has been a gradual shift in the exact
definition of the "social problem" commitment is meant to solve. Increasingly, courts have
sought to include the fetus as a person under the commitment criteria of"dangerous to others"
and to include child abuse as one of the "social problems" associated with pregnant drug
addicts.).
147. See Kary L. Moss, Forced Drug or Alcohol Treatmentfor Pregnant and Postpartum Women: Part
of the Solution or Part of the Problemz?, 17 NEW ENG.J. ON GRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 3-4 (1991)
[hereinafter Forced Drug Treatment] (arguing that forcing women into treatment, whether it is for
their own good or the good of the fetus, subjects pregnant women to a different set of laws than
the rest of society).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. See Wilton, supra note 4, at 154 (discussing the right of
privacy as found by the Court under the Fourteenth Amendment concept of personal liberty).
149. SeeWilton, supra note 4, at 154 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
150. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (referring to marriage as a basic civil
right).
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relationships,153 child rearing154 and education. 55 Opponents of civil
commitment argue that this form of state intervention infringes upon
the right to reproductive and familial privacy, in that it is a form of
governmental regulation, which greatly influences female decision-
making regarding reproduction. 56 More specifically, the threat of
civil commitment is likely to significantly impact upon a drug-addicted
woman's decision-making regarding her pregnancy. 57 For example,
the fear of being committed for drug use during pregnancy may cause
an addicted woman to decide to terminate her pregnancy or, in the
alternative, to avoid seeking prenatal care for fear of detection. Thus,
civil commitment constitutes an "undue burden" on a woman's
privacy rights and therefore, is unconstitutional."0
Those who propose using civil commitment statutes to force drug-
dependent pregnant women to receive treatment adamantly reject the
assertion that state intervention would constitute an unjustified
infringement on the constitutional rights of pregnant women.15 9
Ironically, those who favor committing pregnant drug users rely on
Roe v. Wade, a case usually associated with protecting female autono-
my, to refute the assertion that civil commitment violates the right to
reproductive and familial privacy. 6
151. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the regulation of
contraception is an unconstitutional infringement on marital privacy).
152. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that there is a right to privacy in the
concept of personal liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment which encompasses a woman's
right to choose an abortion).
153. See eg., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (recognizing the right of
relatedpersons to live together in one household); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(creating a right of marital privacy which includes the right to use contraception); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that people have the constitutional right to have
offspring).
154. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (prohibiting the state from
dictating the upbringing of children who are under the control of a parent or guardian).
155. See id. (prohibiting the state from requiring that all children be publicly educated).
156. Seewilton, supra note 4, at 160 (suggesting that legislation needs to be drafted narrowly
so as to safeguard pregnant women's right to bodily integrity and only allow medical
intervention when necessary).
157. Wilton, supra note 4, at 156.
158. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2819
(1992) (holding that the Due Process Clause is violated when a state regulation imposes an
undue burden on a woman by limiting her right to determine whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy).
159. Wilton, supra note 4, at 157.
160. See Louise Marane Chan, Note, S.O.S. From the Womb: A CaU for New York Legislation
Criminalizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 199, 221 (1993) (using Roe,
advocates of state intervention in the pregnancy of drug-addicted women have argued that a
woman's privacy rights do not always outweigh state interests. In Roe, the Court enunciated that
in the third trimester, the state's compelling interest in protecting potential life outweighs the
woman's privacy rights to have an abortion if the means are narrowly tailored.); Wilton, supra
note 4, at 155 (noting that the framework of Roe allows for an increasing state interest as the
woman progresses in her pregnancy).
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In Roe, the Court expressly recognized the health of the mother
and the potential for human life as two legitimate state interests in
the abortion context. 1  Through the trimester approach, the Roe
Court recognized that the state's interest increases as the pregnancy
progresses. 162  Furthermore, in later abortion cases, the Court
indicated that the state's interest in protecting potential life exists
throughout the pregnancy." Thus, the abortion cases arguably
support civil commitment during pregnancy given the justified state
interest, both in protecting the health of the mother and in protect-
ing the potential life of the fetus.
Furthermore, proponents of civil commitment argue that the state
interest in ensuring that infants will be born be born healthy, is much
stronger than the state interest in the abortion context of simply
ensuring that fetuses be bom." Thus, greater intrusion into the
private decisions of pregnant women is constitutionally permitted in
the context of drug addiction during pregnancy than is permitted in
the abortion context. In other words, a woman's constitutional right
to reproductive privacy is not as compelling where the woman
engages in harmful behavior once she has decided to carry her child
to term, as in the abortion context." Once a woman chooses not to
exercise her constitutional right to an abortion, she has an obligation
to protect her fetus and the state has a right to intervene to ensure
such protection.1
The right to bodily integrity was recognized at common law as "the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his [or her]
own person." 67 This right is protected under the Constitution by
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and
161. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (finding a state's interest in preserving the potential life of the
fetus in prior challenges to abortion laws).
162. See id at 163 (finding that in the first trimester, a woman's privacy right generally
outweighs the state's interest in preserving the fetus, but that by the third trimester, the state's
interest becomes compelling due to the viability of the fetus, and outweighs the woman's
interest).
163. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818 (recognizing an abandonment of the trimester system to
ensure the protection of fetal life and the interests of the mother throughout the pregnancy).
164. See Wilton, supra note 4, at 156 (distinguishing the degree of compelling interest a
woman has in deciding whether or not to carry a child to term from her right to determine her
behavior while pregnant).
165. Nat Hentoff, No "Right' to Abuse a Fetus, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1991, at A15. The view
discussed in this article is that of Natasha Lisman, who is on the Massachusetts Board of the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The article makes clear that Lisman's position on this
issue is not supported by her colleagues in the ACLU, who advocate complete autonomy for
pregnant women.
166. i&
167. See Wlton, supra note 4, at 157 (citing Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891) (which held that the lower court could not order plaintiff in a tort suit to submit to a
surgical examination to determine the extent of injury).
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seizures," as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guaran-
tees of due process of law 69 Opponents of involuntary civil commit-
ment assert that this form of state intervention directly infringes upon
the woman's right to bodily integrity as it allows forced drug or
alcohol testing,170 as well as compulsory treatment for substance
addiction.'7
Proponents of civil commitment during pregnancy concede that
this intervention does infringe upon the right to bodily integrity,
however, they contend that this infringement is constitutional where
certain substantive and procedural safeguards are guaranteed.
1 7 1
Infringements on the right to bodily integrity are substantively
justified where the state interests in intrusion outweigh the individu-
al's right to be free from intrusion. I 3 The following are relevant
factors in balancing state interests against the individual interests of
pregnant substance users: the absence of less restrictive alternatives
that protect the state interest while accommodating individual rights;
whether the individual receives some benefit from the intervention;
and whether the intervention is necessary to protect third per-
sons.174 Proponents argue that, in the context of drug use during
pregnancy, this balancing test favors civil commitment because the
168. U.S. CONSr. amend. IV. See also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (finding that
unreasonable bodily intrusion is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment); Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that the right to be free from bodily restraint is included in the
Due Process Clause).
169. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that
competent patients have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment); Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316 (holding that the Due Process Clause creates
a liberty interest in involuntarily committed mental patients to be free from bodily restraint).
170. SeeWlton, supra note 4, at 159 (noting that the possibility of drug testing as part of any
fetal health legislation would infringe on a woman's right to bodily integrity and thus require
constitutional evaluation). See also Kary L. Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV.
WOMEN'S LJ. 278, 291 (arguing that once testing is allowed, reporting would also be required
and would thus violate a woman's privacy interest); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (stating
that patients have a privacy right regarding their mental history).
171. See Wilton, supra note 4, at 160 (discussing the right to bodily integrity as it is
encompassed under the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments due process protections).
172. See Wilton, supra note 4, at 159-60 (noting that relying only on medical necessity,
providing options for voluntary treatment, and using drugs that benefit the mothers as well as
the fetus, are procedural safeguards that could preserve the constitutionality of civil commitment
legislation).
173. See eg., Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853 (finding that the state's interest in protecting life must
be balanced against an individual's right to refuse treatment); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11, 38 (1905) (holding that the state's interest in public health must be weighed against
an individual's right to refuse a smallpox vaccination).
174. SeeWashington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (holding that prison inmates have a
liberty interest in refusing administration of anti-psychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause).
[Vol. 4:105
Fall 1995] DRUG ADDICTION DURING PREGNANCY
state interest in protecting both the mother and the fetus outweighs
the mother's right to bodily integrity.7
In support of this conclusion, proponents argue that any bodily
integrity violation in the context of civil commitment is minimal at
best. In this context, the only bodily invasions are forced drug or
alcohol testing, and possibly, any invasions necessary in treating the
individual for the addiction. Such bodily invasions do not warrant the
same level of constitutional scrutiny as forced stomach pumping to
obtain evidence or compelled continuation of life support sys-
tems. 176  Thus, according to proponents, as long as civil commit-
ment statutes are narrowly drafted to permit only necessary and
effective pregnancy intervention, and adequate procedural safeguards
are guaranteed, the application of civil commitment laws to pregnant
drug-addicts does not violate the constitutional right to bodily
integrity.' 77
Another line of constitutional attack against a state policy of civil
commitment of drug-dependent pregnant women focuses on equal
protection concerns. The testing, reporting and subsequent treat-
ment provisions of Minnesota's law expressly apply only to pregnant
women.1 78  Therefore, on their face, these statutory provisions
classify according to pregnancy.1 79  Other state statutes, while not
facially discriminatory, are arguably applied disproportionately against
pregnant women, and therefore also classify on the basis of pregnan-
cy.18
0
According to opponents of civil commitment, the classifications
created by these statutes cannot withstand equal protection scrutiny.
More specifically, any classification which singles out pregnant women
for special treatment reinforces stereotypical attitudes that have
historically impeded women's efforts to join the workforce on an
equal footing with men, and therefore, unconstitutionally discrimi-
nates against pregnant women.' 81  Opponents further argue that
175. SeeWilton, supra note 4, at 160 (demonstrating the ability of protective statutes to pass
constitutional muster if they are narrowly tailored to accomplish the state's interests).
176. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that the use of morphine
capsules extracted from defendant's stomach against his will, through stomach pumping, to
convict defendant for illegal possession of morphine violated the Due Process Clause); see also
Cruzan, 497 S. Ct. at 261 (holding that competent persons have a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment).
177. Wilton, supra note 4, at 160.
178. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.5561-5562 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
179. MNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.5561-5562 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
180. See Moss, supra note 170, at 293-94 (arguing that state statutes are often based on the
fhlse assumption that it is only the drug taking of the mother that effects the fetus).
181. See California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 300 (1987) (White,
J., dissenting) (asserting that "preferential treatment represents a resurgence of the 19th- century
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these statutes "relegate [women] to second-class status, subjecting
them to different laws than the rest of the populace."" 2 Finally,
there is an injustice in a system which forces treatment upon a
woman, not because she has committed a crime, but rather because
she has become pregnant."
In response to the equal protection challenge, proponents of civil
commitment statutes argue that although these statutes classify on the
basis of pregnancy, it does not subject them to heightened scruti-
ny." In Geduldig v. Aiello,"a the Supreme Court found that preg-
nancy-based discrimination is not gender discrimination because it
does not treat men and women differently; rather, classifications
based on pregnancy treat men and non-pregnant women differently
than pregnant women.1 86 Therefore, pregnancy-based classifications
are only subject to rational-basis constitutional scrutiny.187 Accord-
ing to the proponents of civil commitment, this pregnancy-based
classification survives rational-basis scrutiny because civil commitment
of pregnant drug-addicts is rationally related to the legitimate state
interests in protecting fetuses and rehabilitating pregnant drug
addicts18a
Even if civil commitment of pregnant drug addicts is deemed to
create gender-based classifications and is therefore subject to
heightened equal protection scrutiny, advocates of civil commitment
argue that it survives such scrutiny.8 9 In order to survive constitu-
tional scrutiny, any classifications based on gender must serve
"important governmental objectives" and must be "substantially
related" to achieving those objectives."° Civil commitment of drug-
protective legislation which perpetuated sex-role stereotypes and which impeded women in their
efforts to take their rightful place in the workplace").
182. Forced Drug Treatment, supra note 147, at 4 (criticizing the special treatment of pregnant
women by the law as paternalistic and harmful, despite the laws protective intention).
183. Forced Drag Treatrmt, supra note 147 at 4.
184. SeeJones, supra note 2, at 1168; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (deciding that
strict scrutiny analysis would require a determination of whether restricting the mother's rights
was a necessary means to achieve the state's compelling interest in the protection of potential
life).
185. Gedudig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
186. See id. at 496-97 (applying a rational-basis scrutiny to uphold a California state insurance
program which excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage).
187. Id.
188. SeeJones, supra note 2, at 1168 (discussing the important governmental interests in
protecting human life).
189. SeeJones, supra note 2, at 1168 (proposing a way to pass constitutional muster by
applying a gender neutral statute that punishes men as well as women who supply the fetus with
illegal substances).
190. See Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that an Oklahoma statute which
prohibits the sale of beer to males under the age of twenty-one and females under the age of
eighteen is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection for eighteen to twenty year old men);
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dependent pregnant woman serves the important governmental
objective of protecting fetuses from the harmful effects of substance
abuse during pregnancy. Furthermore, civil commitment of pregnant
substance abusers is substantially related to the achievement of this
objective. By committing these women, the state ensures that they
receive treatment for their addiction and do not continue to use
drugs while pregnant.' Civil commitment of pregnant drug-addicts
arguably survives the two prong heightened equal protection analysis.
The debate between those who support and those who reject forced
civil commitment of pregnant women illustrates how discourse on the
use of involuntary civil commitment statutes degenerates into a battle
over conflicting rights.'92 Opponents criticize these statutes by
arguing that they infringe upon the constitutional rights of women,
while proponents support these statutes because they vindicate fetal
rights. A more useful analysis would focus upon whether or not such
commitment programs achieve the socially desirable goal of promot-
ing healthy births and preserving the mother-child relationship. The
opponents of civil commitment implicitly recognize that in light of
the male-centered structure of existing commitment programs, and
the lack of resources currently available to pregnant women in our
society, involuntary civil commitment, while benevolent in theory, is
not alone capable of achieving its goal .
A system of involuntary civil commitment does not protect the
health of pregnant substance-addicted women who have not voluntari-
ly sought treatment for their fetuses." Currently, there are not
sufficient resources for pregnant substance-addicted women who
voluntarily seek treatment' 95  There are few drug-treatment pro-
see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982) (holding that a state
nursing school policy of only admittingwomen violates the Equal Protection Clause because the
state failed to show a substantial relationship between gender classification and alleged remedial
objective).
191. See Chavkin, supra note 125, at 247-48 (discussing the 1990 findings of the Office of
National Drug Control that involuntary treatment can be effective in producing healthy
newborns).
192. See Chavkin, supra note 125, at 225 (challenging the assertion that civil commitment is
substantially related to achieving the governmental objective of protecting the fetus, given that
the threat of civil commitment is likely to deter pregnant drug-addicts from obtaining prenatal
care).
193. Chavkin, supra note 125, at 241-43.
194. See Christopher D. Webster, Compulsowy Treatment of Narcotic Addiction, 8 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 133, 136 (1986) (analyzing findings in New York, California and Kentucky which
show that historically, involuntary treatment for drug addicts has proven to be largely
ineffectual).
195. See Michele Magar, The Sins of the Mothers, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1991 at 30, 34 (noting
that a National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors survey documented that
in 1989, government-funded treatment centers turned away 250,000 pregnant women).
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grams currently in existence which will treat pregnant women. 196 A
survey of New York treatment centers found that fifty-four percent of
all state-funded programs refuse to accept pregnant women, sixty-
seven percent do not accept pregnant women who are Medicaid
eligible, and only thirteen percent treat pregnant Medicaid eligible
women who are crack-dependent' 97 Jennifer Johnson, a woman
who was criminally prosecuted under the Florida drug delivery statute
for delivering cocaine to her newborn through the umbilical cord,
sought treatment during her pregnancy but was unable to find a
substance abuse treatment center that would accept her.'98 In
striving for a facilitative approach to the problem of substance abuse
during pregnancy, society should seek to expand the treatment
opportunities for pregnant women.
While, it is possible that a system of involuntary civil commitment
might increase the availability of treatment for voluntary, as well as,
involuntary patients. Forcing commitment on pregnant women who
do not desire treatment may inhibit instead of facilitate their choices,
thus creating a maternal-fetal conflict by requiring women to receive
treatment they oppose." Added to this is the fact that the few
treatment centers that currently do admit pregnant women do not
generally provide the comprehensive and unique treatment that
pregnant women require.
Treatment programs almost never provide in-house services for the
care of the children of pregnant women in treatment.20' To
accommodate the needs of pregnant women who have other children,
treatment facilities need to offer child care services within the
treatment centers. A 1986 study of treatment programs in thirty-four
196. See Forced Drug Treatment, supra note 147, at 6 (citing insufficient accessibility to drug
treatment centers that accept pregnant women as a major obstacle to their treatment).
197. See Forced Drug Treatmen4 supra note 147, at 6 (citing David F. Chavkin, Drug Addiction
and Pregnany: Poliy Crossroads; 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 483, 485 (1990) (noting that the
unavailability of suitable treatment facilities constitutes a major obstacle to courts ordering
treatment).
198. SeeJones, supra note 2, at 1175 (citing Derrick Z.Jackson, Inequality and the "Fetal Rights"
Concept, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 25, 1990, at A24 (asserting high risk and liability in drug related
pregnancies as the reason for treatment centers turning away drug addicted pregnant women)).
199. SeeWilton, supra note 4 (noting that the balancing of interests in civil commitment cases
can create a conflict between an unwilling mother and her fetus).
200. See Chavkin, supra note 125, at 242 (discussing the findings of treatment professionals
that pregnant women have unique emotional needs, as well as physical needs such as
transportation and child care); see also Richard Whitmire, Drug-Using, Pregnant Women: Medical
or CiminalProblem?, GANNETr NEvS ERv., Mar. 30, 1994 (quoting Dr. Richard Schwarz, former
President of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, on their 1991 survey
finding a national shortage of drug treatment programs designed for women, "our drug abuse
treatment system is male oriented").
201. See Chavkin, supra note 125, at 242.
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cities nationwide found that lack of child care was the main reason
why drug-addicted women failed to seek available treatment.2 2 In
the absence of child care services, lower-income pregnant drug-
addicted women, who do not have family members or friends to care
for their children, must choose between potentially losing the
children they already have to the foster care system or protecting the
fetus they are carrying by receiving treatment.
The lack of prenatal care in most treatment facilities is another way
in which these facilities do not respond to the treatment needs of
pregnant women. 3 The lack of child care and prenatal care
services is a manifestation of the dominant approach in most
treatment facilities which is to cater to male, rather than female,
experiences and circumstances. 2°4 Pregnant women are forced to
endure treatment which fails to fully serve their needs, such as child
care for other children, so that the interests of their fetuses may be
served. Therefore, a policy of forced commitment of pregnant
women to facilities which are not equipped to address their unique
needs creates a maternal-fetal conflict.
Pregnant women who are not ready to seek voluntary aid or who
are aware that the treatment programs will not serve their unique
needs are likely to perceive involuntary civil commitment as a
threat.205 That is, a woman who has not sought voluntary treatment
has not yet decided to address her addiction and therefore, may be
threatened by compelled treatment. Likewise, civil commitment may
threaten a pregnant, addicted woman with two children who knows
that if she is forced to receive treatment she will lose custody of her
two children while in treatment because the treatment facilities do
not offer in-house child care. The fear of detection is likely to deter
pregnant, addicted women from seeking prenatal care.0 6
202. See Jones, supra note 2, at 1177 (citing Michele L. Nodis, Cries in Dark Often Go
Unansered, WASH. POsT, July 2, 1991, at Al, AS col. 6).
203. Jones, supra note 2, at 1177.
204. See Leslie Laurence, Drug Akohol Programs Designed MostlyforMen, CINN. POST, Aug. 12,
1994, at 4B (citing findings by a General Accounting Office report that in 1990 less than eleven
percent of the estimated 280,000 pregnant women who needed drug treatment received care);
id. at GAO/HRD-90-138 Report, at 36.
205. SeeJoan McKinney, Abuse Programs Said MissingAddicted Pregnant Women, BATON ROUGE
ADvoc., Dec. 2, 1993, at 14A (citing the 1993 study by the Southern Governors' Association
which found that drug-dependant pregnant women avoided treatment because they feared that
their children would be taken away because of their drug problem, or because they could not
find alternative care for their children while they underwent treatment).
206. See Chavkin, supra note 125, at 245-46 (noting that women may lie about their drug
history in a prenatal evaluation or avoid going until their drug usage subsides to a less obvious
level, thus undermining the purpose of prenatal care).
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Pregnancies 'of women addicted to substances are high risk
pregnancies given the harmful effects of substance abuse on the
fetus." 7 Therefore, while prenatal care is essential for all pregnant
women, it is vitally important for pregnant women using substances.
Studies demonstrate that the negative effects of substance abuse
during pregnancy are greatly reduced by providing prenatal care and
helping substance addicted women to abstain during pregnancy.20 8
Furthermore, data developed by the Institute of Medicine shows that
for each dollar spent on providing prenatal care to low-income,
poorly-educated women, society saves three dollars and thirty-eight
cents in medical care for the infants of these women in the first year
of life.20 9 Thus, involuntary civil commitment is problematic to the
extent that it may deter some pregnant, addicted women from
seeking prenatal care.
Involuntary civil commitment of pregnant drug-dependent women,
in light of the structure of treatment facilities and the funding
available to pregnant women in our society, does not achieve the goal
of promoting healthy relationships between mothers and their
children. Rather, legislatures which adopt such statutes, without
restructuring treatment programs to serve the unique needs of
pregnant women, and without increasing the resources available to
pregnant women, would create conflict between mother and fetus.
Civil commitment statutes alone cannot rectify society's failure to
provide pregnant women with the financial, physical, and emotional
aid necessary for healthy pregnancies.
VI. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Society must take action to address the fact that hundreds of
thousands of babies are born each year addicted to drugs. Society
should not seek to address this problem through involuntary
intervention either during or after pregnancy. It does not matter
whether this intervention is criminal prosecution, civil prosecution or
civil commitment. Each of these mechanisms focuses on intervention
207. SeeChavkin, supranote 125, at 245 n.136 (discussing the high risk factors of babies born
to drug abusers including low birth weight and abnormal development).
208. See Chavkin, supra note 125, at 245 n.136 (citing, Ira J. Chasnoff, Drugs, Akohol,
Pregnancy, and the Neonate: Pay Now or Pay Later, 266JAMA 1568 (1991) noting the reduced rate
of prematurity, low birth weight, head size and other complicating factors which effect
newborns, with the improved use of services for drug addicted mothers who receive prenatal
care).
209. See Chavkin, supra note 125, at 245 n.136 (citing, Ira J. Chasnoff, Drugs, Akohol,
Pregnancy, and the Neonate: Pay Now or Pay Later, 266JAMA 1568 (1991) utilizing a cost benefit
analysis this author supports the funding of prenatal programs for drug-addicted mothers and
demonstrates the proven costs to society of caring for their babies).
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rather than assistance, and therefore fail to fulfill society's affirmative
obligation to provide the aid which pregnant women need to fulfill
their unique role as nurturers. The key distinction between interven-
tion and assistance is the voluntariness of the participation. When the
state intervenes to address substance abuse during pregnancy, the
pregnant woman is forced to follow the dictates of the state. In
contrast, when the state offers assistance to a pregnant woman, it is
facilitating and expanding her choices so that, through her own free
will, she may make decisions beneficial to both herself and her
unborn child. Society has an obligation to offer assistance rather than
intervention.
Cultural feminism supports the notion that because of the unique
and celebrated role of women as mothers, society has a duty to
recognize and accommodate the special needs of pregnant wom-
en.2" ' This societal duty includes the obligation to address the
particularized needs of pregnant substance addicted women. The
notion underlying the argument for greater public responsibility is
that by eradicating public neglect, and educating parents, society
encourages and enables private responsibility.2 ' Thus, legislatures
should be more concerned with providing a "social fabric" which will
assist parents and their children to form trusting relationships." 2
Applying this philosophy to drug use during pregnancy, society
should adopt measures which demonstrate concern for women and
their children by developing a comprehensive health care system that
includes prenatal care as well as gender-sensitive drug treatment
programs.213 Furthermore, society must offer this assistance prior
to pregnancy by developing programs to discourage alcohol and drug
use and taking account of the factors which lead to substance abuse
such as poverty and inadequate nutrition.1 4
By giving all-encompassing assistance prior to pregnancy or birth,
society would best facilitate private responsibility. For example,
society must recognize and address the fact that poverty prevents
many pregnant women in our society from receiving adequate
210. Child Abuse, supra note 56, at 95.
211. See Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Childrens Rights,
9 H v. WOMEN's L.J. 1, 24 (1986) (discussing the interconnected spheres of public and private
responsibility in child rearing).
212. See id. at 24 (using the family court as a base from which children and adults can create
trusting relationships based on public and private responsibility).
213. See Forced Drug Treatment, supra note 147, at 16 (maintaining that gender-sensitive
programs will better fit the life of drug addicted women and will focus on factors like poverty
and health).
214. Forced Drug Treatment, supra note 147, at 16.
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prenatal care.215 The lack of funding allocated to providing prena-
tal care to lower-income pregnant women is a separate and distinct
social problem which aggravates the social problem of substance-abuse
during pregnancy. That is, the lack of prenatal care gives rise to a
lack of information which, in turn, leads to substance abuse during
pregnancy. Women who do not receive prenatal care are often
unaware that substance abuse during pregnancy has harmful effects
on fetuses, and therefore engage in such abuse. Society has an
obligation to educate pregnant women as to the harmful effects of
prenatal substance abuse on their fetuses so that they may act
responsibly to protect their fetuses. Thus, by guaranteeing prenatal
care to all pregnant women, society would provide the preconditions
necessary for private responsibility.
Some state legislatures have recognized the social duty to care for
and aid pregnant women by adopting holistic approaches to the social
problem of substance addiction during pregnancy.216 For example,
Washington State passed the "Maternity Access Bill" in 1989 which
provides substantial funding for drug and alcohol treatment pro-
grams.217 This program caters to the needs of pregnant women and
gives them priority status for receipt of treatment services.1
Wisconsin, in 1989, appropriated funds for the dissemination of
information regarding the effects of substance addiction during
pregnancy and available treatment.219 In addition, the Wisconsin
legislature provided funding for comprehensive alcohol and drug
treatment, including prenatal care, for pregnant women addicted to
alcohol or drugs.220  In 1989, the Oregon state legislature also
provided funding to serve the unique needs of pregnant women. The
funding provided for the biological needs of pregnant women, such
as detoxification, dietary, and obstetrical services, along with the
physical and psychological needs, such as child care, transportation,
housing assistance, and education.221
215. See Stovall, supra note 89, at 1277 n.67 (citing Elizabeth Rosenthal, Despite More Funds,
Women Face Barriers to Prenatal Care, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1993, at C12) (discussing obstacles to
women's access to prenatal care including lack of organization in public health facilities, long
waits to see medical personnel and other socio-economic factors such as education, or single
parent status).
216. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 74.09.760 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995).
217. Id
218. See Horowitz, supra note 102, at 8 (discussing the various programs recently enacted in
states like Washington which sought to expand its drug treatment program for pregnant
women).
219. Horowitz, supra note 102, at 8.
220. Horowitz, supra note 102, at 8.
221. Horowitz, supra note 102, at 8.
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State health officials in Maryland recognized the need for holistic
treatment of substance addiction during pregnancy when they
provided $1,050,000 as initial funding for The Center for Addiction
and Pregnancy at Francis Scott Key Medical Center. 22 This Center
is one of the few treatment programs in the nation which adopts a
multi-disciplinary approach to the treatment of substance-addicted
pregnant women. The main goal of the Center is to "give the
children of drug addicts a more promising start," while at the same
time, "improv[ing] their mother's lives."223 The philosophy of the
Center is that, in order to achieve this goal, it must provide patients
with more than just treatment for substance-addiction. Thus, in
conjunction with addiction treatment, the Center provides both
prenatal care and child care services. 24  In addition, the Center
informs its patients of proper nutrition during pregnancy and the use
of reliable birth control. Perhaps most importantly, the Center
teaches vital parenting skills and emphasizes the importance of
nurturing the mother-child bond.2
The Center for Addiction and Pregnancy is an entirely voluntary
program. Women seeking treatment are usually accepted into the
program within forty-eight to seventy-two hours of their initial request
for admission.22 While the Center is a sixteen bed-unit, the struc-
ture of the program enables the Center to treat more than sixteen
patients at one time. Patients are treated on an in-patient basis only
for the first seven days of their treatment.227 After this initial
period, patients are given "intensive out-patient care." That is, they
come to the Center each day to receive multi-disciplinary treatment
and return to their homes each evening. The Center provides
transportation for its patients to ensure that they are able to receive
their daily treatment.22 The highest percentage of "drop-out"
222. SeeAmy Goldstein, A Fresh Start and a New Life State-Funded Center Melds Drug Treatment
and Prenatal Care to Help Recovering Addicts and Their Babies, WASH. POST, June 11, 1992, at M1.
In May of 1994, the name of the program discussed in this article was changed to the Center
for Addiction and Pregnancy at Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center.
223. See id. (asserting that seventy percent of all babies born drug addicted suffer from some
form of learning or health disability and the Center works towards producing healthier mothers
and babies).
224. Id.
225. Telephone interview with Lisa Weinstein, Intake Coordinator for the Center for
Addiction and Pregnancy (May 1994) [hereinafter Telephone interview with Ms. Weinstein]. The
author was informed prior to the publication of this paper that Ms. Weinstein was no longer
employed by the Center.
226. Telephone intmriew with Ms. Weinstein, supra note 225.
227. Telephone interview with Ms. Weinstein, supra note 225.
228. Telephone interview with Ms. Weinstein, supra note 225.
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occurs during the transition from in-patient care to out-patient
care.229 In order to combat this, the Center has developed incentive
programs to encourage women to continue their treatment beyond
the initial seven days. For example, women who return for out-
patient treatment are eligible to win weekly drawings and receive
prizes. Such incentive programs have been helpful in decreasing the
drop-out rate during this transition period.32
As of 1994, the success of the Center is proven by the fact that, on
average, the babies born there are heavier and closer to term.
23 1
The reason for the success of the Center is undoubtedly its multi-
disciplinary approach to treatment 22 In order to effectively treat
pregnant substance-addicted women who have limited resources,
treatment programs must provide prenatal care, child care, transporta-
tion and educational opportunities.233
Skeptics may argue that such holistic approaches to the problem of
substance abuse during pregnancy may be sound in theory, but are
not practical because they are too expensive. However, this argument
fails in light of the extraordinary cost of providing the necessary
medical attention and special education for children born addicted
to substances. The increase of social funding to eradicate drug-
addiction during pregnancy by aiding drug-addicted women cannot
be rejected as too expensive given the costs which society already
incurs as a result of the problem of substance-addiction during
pregnancy.
States who have used involuntary civil commitment to address the
problems of substance abuse during pregnancy should not be faulted
entirely. At least, through commitment laws, states are recognizing
the need to allocate funding towards the treatment of addicted
women in order to help them in their unique role as child bearers.
However, forced civil commitment of pregnant women is, at best, a
band-aid solution to the problem of drug addiction during pregnancy.
Furthermore, it is an unjust solution in light of the lack of resources
presently available to many pregnant women, as well as the current
male-centered structure of most treatment facilities. Rather than
allocating funding for forced civil commitment, state legislatures must
devote funds toward facilitating the choices of pregnant women by
providing them with financial, physical, emotional, and educational
229. Telephone interuiew with Ms. Weinstein, supra note 225.
230. Telephone interview with Ms. Weinstein, supra note 225.
231. Telephone interview with Ms. Weinstein, supra note 225.
232. Telephone interview with Ms. Weinstein, supra note 225.
233. Telephone interview with Ms. Weinstein, supra note 225.
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support. There is an undeniable need to increase social programs in
this area. Parenting is the most importantjob in our society. Society
has an affirmative obligation to offer the necessary assistance and care
so that all woman and their partners may have the opportunity to
have healthy babies.

